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EAGAN v. CALHOUN: A CHILD MAY BRING A WRONGFUl. 
DEATH ACTION AGAINST A PARENT FOR THE 
INTENTIONAL KILLING OF THE OTHER PARENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American jurisprudence suggests that all people have a right to 
address and receive just compensation for wrongs committed 
against them.) However, this right does not always extend to all per-
sons. Maryland courts, for instance, adhere to the doctrine of par-
ent-child immunity that prevents civil liability between parents and 
children for torts and other wrongs.2 
Mter the parent-child immunity doctrine was first adopted by 
the Mississippi Supreme Court in 189t,3 many states subsequently 
adopted it in some form, including Maryland.4 The doctrine has 
since evolved to prevent children from suing their parents in situa-
tions such as automobile torts and wrongful death actions.s Despite 
adopting the parent-child immunity doctrine, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland has crafted several exceptions to it. Recently the court 
of appeals held that when one parent intentionally causes the other 
parent's death by voluntary manslaughter, the parent-child immu-
nity doctrine does not preclude the child's wrongful death action 
1. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF ToRTS § 1, at 
5-7 (5th ed. 1984). 
2. See Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 697 A.2d 468 (1997) (reaffirming the vital-
ity of the parent-child immunity doctrine to preserve the integrity of the fam-
ily unit and parental authority); Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 650 A.2d 252 
(1994) (refusing to extend parent-child immunity to stepparents); Yost v. Yost, 
172 Md. 128, 190 A. 753 (1937) (holding that a minor child cannot sue a par-
ent for acts of partial negligence incident to the parental relationship); 
Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930) (establishing that a 
guardian cannot sue his ward). 
3. See Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885, 887 (Miss. 1891) (holding that minor chil-
dren are forbidden from asserting claims of civil redress for personal injuries 
suffered at the hands of their parents) overruled by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 
2d 906, 907 (Miss. 1992). 
4. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. However, many states have since ab-
rogated or modified this doctrine to combat its harsh results. See infra note 
43 and accompanying text. 
5. See Renko, 346 Md. at 480, 697 A.2d at 474 (quoting Glaskox, 614 So.2d at 911). 
235 
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against the parent who committed the wrong.6 
In Eagan v. Calhoun,' the mother of two minor children was 
killed by their father.8 Under then-existing Maryland law, it ap-
peared as though the suit could fit within one of the exceptions to 
the parent-child immunity doctrine, depending upon how egregious 
the court considered the underlying facts.9 The court of appeals 
held that, not only did voluntary manslaughter fit within one of the 
previously adopted exceptions to this restrictive doctrine, but that it 
did so as a matter of law. 10 
This Note will examine the parent-child immunity doctrine as it 
has developed in several jurisdictions, with particular emphasis on 
how Maryland deals with parent-child immunity issues. Part II be-
gins by tracing the emergence of the parent-child immunity doc-
trine in general and its eventual abrogation in several states. 11 Part 
II then focuses on how the doctrine developed in Maryland and the 
exceptions Maryland courts have made to the doctrine in lieu of ab-
rogating it.12 Part II concludes by examining the interplay between 
the parent-child immunity doctrine and Maryland's wrongful death 
statute. 13 
Part III of this Note discusses Eagan v. Calhoun,14 a case decided 
by Maryland's highest court that recognized a category of cases that 
the parent-child immunity doctrine will not apply to as a matter of 
law. IS The Eagan court's holding permits a child to bring a wrongful 
death suit against a parent who intentionally kills the child's other 
parent. 16 Part IV analyzes Eagan, explaining the reasons why Mary-
land courts insist on retaining the parent-child immunity doctrine I.' 
and the case's impact on domestic abuse}S Part V concludes by sug-
gesting that although the Eagan holding presents a fair and equita-
ble alternative to abrogating the parent-child immunity doctrine, 
6. See Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 83-84, 698 A2d 1097, 1103 (1997). 
7. 347 Md. 72, 698 A.2d 1097 (1997). 
8. See ill. at 77-78, 698 A2d at 1100. 
9. For a development and discussion of this exception, see infra notes 97-105 and 
accompanying text. 
10. See Eagan, 347 Md. at 88, 698 A2d at 1105. 
11. See infra notes 2~9 and accompanying text. 
12. See infra notes 9a-151 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 152-76 and accompanying text. 
14. 347 Md. 72, 698 A2d 1097 (1997). 
15. See infra notes 177-257 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra note 234 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra notes 258-83 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 284-89 and accompanying text. 
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completely abrogating the doctrine may be more desirable than 
continuing to resolve cases under Maryland's common-law scheme 
of exceptions. 19 
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A. The Emergence of the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine 
At common law, children had distinct legal identities, were en-
titled to the benefits of their own property, and were permitted to 
bring actions for torts and other wrongs.20 Common law also recog-
nized that "parents possessed rights which were superior to the per-
sonal rights of their children, in order to enable the parents to per-
form their duties more effectually and to recompense them for 
their care and trouble in the discharge of those duties. "21 Early 
cases suggest that those parental rights that were deemed superior 
to the child's related to governing and disciplining children.22 
Nonetheless, the early cases seemed to respect the right of a 
child to sue a parent in tort.23 Although parents were allowed to dis-
cipline and control their children, they could still be liable "in ex-
treme cases of cruelty and injustice, ... malice or wicked motives[,] 
or an evil heart in punishing a child."24 As long as parents disci-
plined in a reasonable and moderate manner, however, the state 
could not intervene in the parent-child relationship.25 
In 1891, parent-child immunity first arose in a decision ren-
dered by the Supreme Court of Mississippi.26 In Hewellette v. George,27 
19. See infra notes 290-93 and accompanying text. 
20. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 122, at 904; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 895G cmt. b (1965). 
21. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 64, 77 A.2d 923, 924 (1951). 
22. See Samuel Mark Pipino, In Whose Best Interest7 Explming the Continuing Vaability 
of the Parentalimmunity Doctrine, 53 OHIO ST. LJ. 1111, 1111-12 (1992) (discuss-
ing the "great trilogy" of early cases which establish the role of immunity in 
tort actions brought by children against their parents). 
23. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 150 A. 905, 907 (N.H. 1930) (suggesting that at English 
common law, a child might have had a cause of action for an assault commit-
ted by the father). 
24. Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114, 122 (1859) (holding that there may be criminal 
liability when disciplinary measures go too far). 
25. See Pipino, supra note 22, at 1120-21. Reasonably prudent parent standards al-
low courts to respect family autonomy while reserving the right to intervene 
when a parent's acts are unreasonable. See ide 
26. Hewellette v. George, 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891) (JIJerruled by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 
614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992). 
27. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891) overruled by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 
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this court denied a minor recovery after the mother wrongfully 
committed her daughter to an insane asylum.28 Without precedent 
or authority, the court stated that "so long as the parent is under 
obligation to care for, guide, and control, and the child is under re-
ciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and obey, no such action as 
this can be maintained. "29 The court espoused the public policy ra-
tionale that a child should be prevented from bringing this type of 
civil action in order to maintain familial harmony in society.30 The 
court further reasoned that a minor child's appropriate means of 
redress and protection was through the state's criminal laws, not 
through civil actions.31 
Many states adopted the parent-child immunity doctrine32 
under similar policy rationales, at times in rather disturbing and 
atrocious cases. For example, in Roller v. Roller,33 the Supreme Court 
of Washington dismissed a daughter'S civil suit against her father for 
rape, even after the father had been criminally convicted.34 The 
court dismissed the suit, citing the public policy of preserving do-
mestic tranquility.35 In response to the argument that this policy jus-
tification was inapplicable because the family's harmony was irrepa-
rably destroyed,36 the court retorted: 
There seems to be some reason in this argument, but it 
overlooks the fact that courts, in determining their jurisdic-
1992). 
28. See id. Although the decision did not elaborate on the facts, the daughter was 
a prostitute in Chicago and the mother brought her back home in order to 
reform her ways. See Sandra L. Haley, Comment, The Parental Tort Immunity 
Doctrine: Is it a Defensible Defense', 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 575, 577-78 n.6 (1996). 
When the daughter refused to change, the mother committed her to an in-
sane asylum for 10 days. See id. 
29. Hewellette, 9 So. at 887. Although the daughter was married, she was living in 
the care of her mother at the time of the alleged injuries. See id. Therefore, 
the parent-child relationship had not been sufficiently severed to allow the 
suit. See id. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. 
32. See Caroline E. Johnson, A Cry For Help: An A?gUment -For Abrogation of the Parent 
Child Tort Immunity Doctrine in Child Abuse and Incest Cases, 21 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 
617, 624 (1993) (noting that 44 states at some time have adopted some form 
of the parent-child immunity). 
33. 79 P. 788 (Wash. 1905). 
34. See id. at 788-89. 
35. See id. 
36. See id.; see also Malcolm L. Jacobson, Note, Right of a Minor Child Against a Par-
ent Tort Feasor, 12 MD. L. REv. 202, 205 (1957). 
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tion or want of jurisdiction, rely upon certain unifonn prin-
ciples of law, and, if it be once established that a child has 
a right to sue a parent for a tort, there is no practical line 
of demarkation [sic] which can be drawn, for the same 
principle which would allow the action . . . in this case, 
would allow an action to be brought for any other tOrt.37 
239 
The court's reasoning effectively elevated the theoretical basis of the 
doctrine over the practical absurdity of its application to the facts in 
the case, and in so doing, failed to provide adequate redress for 
children.38 As the parent-child immunity doctrine developed in juris-
dictions that mechanically applied its dictates, parents were insu-
lated from civil liability for injuries to children that resulted from 
their failure to perfonn parental duties, excessive punishments that 
were not maliciously inflicted, and negligent disrepair of the 
home.39 Any potential act or omission aligned with the parent-child 
relationship itself was effectively immunized.40 
B. States that Abrogated Parent-Child Immunity 
Mter Hewellette v. George,41 states began to adopt the parent-child 
immunity doctrine without significant consideration of its potential 
ramifications.42 However, "no sooner had American courts ... em-
braced the parental immunity doctrine than they began to fashion a 
number of qualifications and exceptions to it. "43 The following is a 
37. Roller, 79 P. at 788-89. 
38. See Rhonda I. Framm, Note, Parent-Child Tort Immunity: Time for Maryland to Ab-
rogate an Anachronism, 11 U. BALT. L REv. 435, 439 (1982). 
39. See Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926. 
40. See id. 
41. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891) uverruJed by Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 
1992). 
42. See Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 650 (Cal. 1971) ("Other states quickly 
adopted the rule of [Hewellette] and Roller, applying it to actions for negligence 
as well as for intentional torts, occasionally with more emotion than reason.") 
(citing Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 145 A. 753 (Conn. 1929); Elias v. Collins, 211 
N.W. 88 (Mich. 1926); Taubert v. Taubert 114 N.W. 763 (Minn. 1908); Small v. 
Morrison, 118 S.E. 12 (N.C. 1923); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 162 N.E. 551 
(N.Y. 1928); Matarese v. Matarese, 131 A. 198 (RI. 1925); Wick v. Wick, 212 
N.W. 787 (Wis. 1927»; see also Johnson, supra note 32 at 624. 
43. Gibson, 479 P.2d at 650 (citing Robert A. Belzer, Comment, Child v. Parent: Ero-
sion of the Immunity Rule, 19 HAsTINGS LJ. 201 (1967»; see generaUy Haley, supra 
note 28, at 58~92 (discussing the exceptions to parent-child immunity); A. 
John Hoomani & Kimberly Sieredzki Woodell, Liner v. Brown: W1Iere Should We 
Go From Here-Two Different Approaches For North Carolina, 19 CAMPBELL L REv. 
447,454 nn.52-55 (1997) (noting that 14 states do not recognize or have com-
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brief discussion of the rationale underlying several states' decisions 
to pull back the command of this doctrine. 
1. A Qualified Abrogation of the Doctrine 
In Goller v. White,44 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin abrogated 
the parent-child immunity doctrine in negligence cases. In Goller, 
Daniel Goller brought suit against James White, his foster father, 
and White's insurer for injuries Goller sustained on a farm tractor.4S 
The trial court held that because White stood in loco parentis to Gol-
ler, parent-child immunity protected him from any liability for neg-
ligence.46 Although White had liability coverage for his workers, the 
policy excluded coverage to family members, thereby precluding 
Goller's recovery from the insurance company as well.47 On appeal, 
the court partially abrogated the parent-child immunity doctrine 
and allowed Goller's suit to continue against his foster father.48 
In abrogating the parent-child immunity doctrine in negligence 
cases, the Goller court carved out two scenarios in which the doc-
trine would continue to bar suits.49 First, parent-child immunity 
would still apply when the alleged negligent act involved an exercise 
of ordinary parental authority over the child.sO Second, the doctrine 
pletely abrogated the child-parent immunity doctrine; 26 states have partially 
abrogated the doctrine; 10 states still recognize parent-child immunity in its 
original form). . 
44. 122 N.W.2d 193 (Wis. 1963) (abolishing parent-child immunity in negligence 
cases, with noted caveats). The Restatement (Second) of Torts has similarly aban-
doned the use of the parent-child immunity doctrine. Comment c of section 
895G suggests that the reasons for retaining the doctrine do not outweigh the 
urgent need to compensate the injured person, particularly a child, for genu-
ine harm that may affect his entire future. The pertinent section reads: "A 
parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other s!5lely by reason 
of that relationship." REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 20, § 895G. 
45. See Goller, 122 N.W.2d at 193. While riding a tractor driven by his foster father, 
the child was injured when protruding bolts from a wheel caught his trouser 
leg. See it!. Goller alleged that his foster father acted negligently by permitting 
him to ride on the tractor's drawbar, failing to warn him of the protruding 
bolts, and failing to seek immediate treatment after the accident. See it!. 
46. See ill. at 196. 
47. See ill. at 194-95. 
48. See ill. at 198. Although refusing to afford White parental immunity, the con-
currence concluded that White was not a parent in loco parrmtis. See ill. (Brown, 
j., concurring). The concurrence reasoned that Goller's residence did not jus-
tify extending "to White the immunities possessed by a true parent." [d. 
(Brown, J., concurring). 
49. See ill. 
50. See ill. 
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continued to apply when the alleged negligent act involved an exer-
cise of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of 
food, clothing, household items, and health care.51 
2. Completely Abrogating the Doctrine 
In Gibson v. Gibson,52 the Supreme Court of California com-
pletely abrogated the parent-child immunity doctrine.53 The Gibson 
court agreed with the Goller court's opinion that "traditional con-
cepts of negligence cannot be blindly applied" to the unique par-
ent-child relationship.54 Instead of following the Goller court's ap-
proach of carving out certain situations in which the immunity 
would continue to apply, however, the Gibson court abolished the 
parent-child immunity doctrine.55 
The Gibson court recognized that tort concepts that control 
whether liability will attach necessarily differ when a child brings a 
suit against a parent.56 For example, the court noted that a parent 
may exercise certain authority over a minor child, such as spanking, 
that would otherwise be tortious if directed towards someone else.57 
Instead of creating categories in which the parent-child immunity 
doctrine would still apply, however, the Gibson court fashioned a 
modified approach to assessing tort liability for parents-the "rea-
sonable parent" standard.58 The court held that "although a parent 
has the prerogative and the duty to exercise authority over his mi-
nor child, this prerogative must be exercised within reasonable lim-
its. "59 The California court found the authority for "reasonable pa-
rental discipline" in an earlier California case-Emery v. EmeryflJ In 
Emery, the court commented: 
51. See ill. 
52. 479 P.2d 648, 655 (Cal. 1971). 
53. See ill. at 650-54. 
54. See ill. at 652. 
55. See ill. at 652-53. 
56. See ill. 
57. See ill. 
58. See ill. at 655 (holding that the proper test for a parent's conduct is what an 
ordinary, reasonable, and prudent parent would have done in similar circum-
stances). The court chose this standard because it believed that the Goller deci-
sion would allow the parent "carte blanche to act negligently toward his 
child." ld. at 653. 
59. ld. 
60. 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955) (holding that the parent-child immunity doctrine 
does not bar suits for willful and malicious torts). Nota.bly, the Emory court 
also held that the plaintiff could sue her brother for negligence. See ill. 
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Since the law imposes on the parent a duty to rear and dis-
cipline his child and confers the right to prescribe a course 
of reasonable conduct for its development, the parent has a 
wide discretion in the performance of his parental func-
tions, but that discretion does not include the right willfully 
to inflict personal injuries beyond the limits of reasonable 
parental discipline.61 
Although Emory specifically addressed "willful parental miscon-
duct, "62 the Gibson court found the same reasoning applicable to 
negligence.63 Thus, the test used in Gibson is what an ordinary, rea-
sonable, and prudent parent would have done under the 
circumstances.64 
The Gibson court favored the "reasonable parent" approach 
over the approach taken by the Goller court for two reasons.6S First, 
it predicted that the Goller court's categories in which the parent-
child immunity doctrine would still apply could result in the "draw-
ing of arbitrary distinctions about when particular parental conduct 
falls within or without the immunity guidelines."66 Second, the court 
noted that under Goller, a parent may "act negligently with impu-
nity" simply by "bringing himself within the 'safety' of parental im-
munity. "67 Thus, in California, a child is not barred from suing a 
61. Id. at 224. 
62. Id. 
63. See Gibson, 479 P.2d at 653. 
64. See id. See generally Haley, supra note 28, at 595 n.99 (citing Anderson v. 
Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980); Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 
(Mo. 1991» (discussing other states that have adopted the "reasonably pru-
dent parent" standard). However, the flexibility this test affords has also 
drawn much criticism. See Carla Maria Marcolin, Comment, Rousey v. Rousey: 
The District of Columbia Joins the National Trend T(JWards Abolition of Parental Im-
munity, 37 CATH. U. L REv. 767,787-88 (1988). According to one court, "con-
sidering the different economic, educational, cultural, ethnic and religious 
backgrounds which must prevail, there are so many combinations and permu-
tations of parent<hild relationships that may result that the search for a stan-
dard would necessarily be in vain-and properly so." Holodook v. Spencer, 324 
N.E.2d 338, 346 (N.Y. 1974). In discussing a similar assessment by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, one commentator noted that courts generally use an objec-
tive reasonableness standard for all tort actions and that a court could ac-
count for such diversity by instructing a jury to consider various factors creat-
ing this diversity. See Marcolin, supra, at 788 (discussing Pedigo v. Rowley, 610 
P.2d 560, 564 (Idaho 1980». For a discussion of Holodook, see infra note 73. 
65. See Gibson, 479 P.2d at 653. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
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parent, but the standards to impose tort liability on parents permits 
more leeway than if the conduct was directed towards an individual 
who was not the defendant's child.68 
In Gelbman v. Gelhman69, the Court of Appeals of New York also 
abolished the parent-child immunity doctrine.7° The Gelhman court 
reasoned that previous court decisions creating exceptions to the 
parent-child immunity doctrine failed to employ consistent logic to 
guide lower courts in deciding when to depart from the doctrine.71 
The court noted the '1udicial erosion of the [parent-child] immu-
nity doctrine" by courts of other states and recognized that the sup-
posed goal of maintaining family harmony was no longer being 
served.72 The court assumed the power to revoke the doctrine 
rather than waiting for the legislature to take action because the 
doctrine itself was a court-created rule.73 
68. See ill. at 652-54. 
69. 245 N.E.2d 192 (1969); see also Martin J. Rooney & Colleen M. Rooney, Paren-
tal Tort Immunity: Span! the Liability, Spoil the Parent, 25 NEW ENG. L REv. 1161. 
1171-73 (1991) (discussing New York courts' handling of the parent-child im-
munity issue). 
70. See Gelbman, 245 N.E.2d at 194. 
71. See id. at 193 (noting that immunity is inapplicable in suits involving eman-
cipated children, property damage, and intentional torts). "These exceptions 
neither permit reconciliation with the family immunity doctrine, nor provide 
a meaningful pattern of departure from the rule. Rather, they attest the prim-
itive nature of the rule and require its repudiation." Id. 
72. See id. 
73. See Holodook. In Holodook v. Spencer, 324 N.E.2d 338 (1974), however, the Court 
of Appeals of New York stated that although it had effectively abrogated par-
ent-child immunity, it would not recognize a child's action for negligent su-
pervision. See Holodook at 342. Parents may be subject to forfeiture of custody 
and criminal sanctions for failure to supervise their children or provide mini-
mum standards of care. See ill. at 343. However, the court refused to recognize 
that negligent supervision was a tort that would subject the parent to civil lia-
bility. See id. If this type of claim were allowed, the court reasoned, "it would 
be the rare parent who could not conceivably be called to account in the 
courts for his conduct toward his child." Id. The court refused to construct a 
standard for a parent's supervision, opining that this is an aspect of the family 
within the discretion of the parent. See ill. at 346 ("Supervision is uniquely a 
matter for the exercise of judgmenL For this reason, parents have always had 
the right to determine how much independence, supervision and control a 
child should have, and best to judge the character and extent of development 
of their child."). Thus, it is fair to say that a small fragment of the parent-
child immunity doctrine continues to linger in New York courts through this 
narrow holding. See id. at 343. 
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3. Abrogating the Doctrine in Motor Tort Cases 
Other state court decisions further justify abrogating the par-
ent-child immunity doctrine, lending support to California's criti-
cism that the doctrine is "a legal anachronism. "74 One common 
area in which courts have abrogated the doctrine is in motor tort 
cases.7S In Sorensen v. Sorensen,16 the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts chose to abrogate the parent-child immunity doctrine in 
motor tort cases in an effort to promote insurance recovery.77 The 
court noted that the recent abrogations in other states showed a 
"distaste for a rule of law which in one sweep disqualifie[s] an en-
tire class of injured minors. "78 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania espoused a similar ratio-
nale in Falco v. Pados,79 when it abrogated the doctrine for motor 
tort cases. In Falco, the court opined that the greatest harm to the 
domestic tranquility of the family was not caused by the child's law-
suit against the parent, but by the damages from the injury itself. 80 
At the time of the case, Pennsylvania law permitted children's ac-
tions against their parents that involved property rights or allega-
tions of breach of contract.81 The court noted, "[i]t seems absurd to 
say that it is legal and proper for an unemancipated child to bring 
an action against his parent concerning the child's property rights 
yet to be utterly without redress with reference to injury to his 
person. "82 
74. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d. 648, 648 (Cal. 1971). 
75. See, e.g., Ooms v. Ooms, 316 A.2d 783, 785 (Conn. 1972) (abrogating the doc-
trine of parent-child immunity in actions for negligence in the operation of a 
motor vehicle); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669, 673 (Del. 1976) (allowing a 
child to sue their parent for automobile torts to the extent of the parent's au-
tomobile liability insurance coverage); Krouse v. Krouse, 489 So. 2d 106, 
108-09 (Fla. 1986) (abrogating parent-child immunity in motor tort cases); 
Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906, 910 n.5 (Miss. 1992) (providing a compre-
hensive index of states that have abrogated or partially abrogated the parent-
child immunity doctrine in motor tort cases). 
76. 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975). 
77. See id. at 916. 
78. [d. at 912 (quoting Gibson, 479 P.2d at 650) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted); see also Haley, supra note 28, at 581 n.26 (discussing states that have abro-
gated the parent-child immunity doctrine in motor tort cases); Johnson, supra 
note 32, at 632 n.loo (stating that 29 states have refused to apply the parent-
child immunity in cases involving motor torts). 
79. 282 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1971). 
80. See id. at 355. 
81. See id. 
82. [d. (quoting Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ohio 1952) (holding that a 
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The Falco court also rejected the argument that the parent-
child immunity doctrine prevented collusive and fraudulent actions 
to be brought between parents and children.83 The court explained 
that juries and trial courts were implemented for the purpose of 
preventing collusive claims.84 Accordingly, the court held that immu-
nity was unnecessary to accomplish this purpose and agreed to ab-
rogate the doctrine in motor tort cases.8S 
Finally, in Glaskox v. Glaskox,86 the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi, the same court that created the parent-child immunity doc-
trine in 1891, abrogated the doctrine in the area of motor tort 
cases.87 In Glaskox, the court reasoned that there was no justification 
for barring children from the same rights to legal redress that 
others in society enjoy.88 The court held that the "judicially created 
. doctrine of parental immunity hard] outlived its purpose."89 
C. Maryland Adopts the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine 
Maryland first adopted the parent-child immunity doctrine in 
Schneider v. Schneider.90 In Schneider, a daughter was driving a car, 
with her mother as a passenger, when the car was involved in an ac-
cident.91 The mother sustained injuries from the accident and sued 
the child.92 The court found that the doctrine articulated in Hewel-
parent is not immune from liability in a tort action brought by his unemanci-
pated minor child who has been injured at his parent's business» (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
83. See ill. 
84. See ill. 
85. See ill. at 356. The court opined that it was more efficient to allow the courts 
to determine which claims are meritorious and which are frivolous. See ill. Fur-
thermore, the injustice of denying recovery purely on the basis of a family re-
lationship outweighs the danger of fraud.·See ill. at 355 (citing Tamashiro v. 
DeGama, 450 P.2d 998, 1001-02 (Haw. 1969) (noting that the parent<hild im-
munity doctrine cannot be asserted to avoid liability when a parent is injured 
because of the negligent operation of an automobile by a child». 
86. 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992). 
87. See ill. at 911. 
88. See ill.; see also Kirchner v. Crystal, 474 N.E.2d 275, 278 (Ohio 1984) (emphasiz-
ing that by abrogating the parent<hild immunity doctrine, courts "provide the 
innocent victims of tortious conduct the forum they deserve in attempting to 
redress their claims"). . 
89. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d at 912. 
90. 160 Md. 18, 152 A 498 (1930) (holding that the mother could not bring suit 
against her son for injuries suStained in an automobile accident, even though 
the son may have been negligent). 
91. See ill. at 18, 152 A at 498. 
92. See ill. 
246 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
lette-the seminal 1891 Mississippi case creating the parent-child im-
munity doctrine-should apply to prevent parents from suing their 
minor children.93 The court reasoned that because the parent serves 
as guardian and protector of the child's interests, it would be incon-
sistent for the parent to attempt to recover a judgment against the 
child.94 The court concluded that a parent could not simultaneously 
occupy the positions of both guardian of the minor and a plaintiff 
seeking to recover against that minor.95 
D. Exceptions to Maryland's Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine 
After Schneider, Maryland courts developed and refined the par-
ent-child immunity doctrine in various situations. Maryland courts 
have not chosen to abrogate the doctrine entirely, despite persua-
sive authority to do so from sister states.96 Instead, Maryland courts 
have created numerous exceptions to the doctrine. On four occa-
sions, the Court of Appeals of Maryland has departed from the con-
fines of the parent-child immunity doctrine. 
First, the doctrine does not apply when a child suffers injuries 
that result from cruel and inhuman treatment or malicious and 
wanton wrongs.97 In Mahnke v. Moore,98 Russell Moore murdered his 
minor daughter'S mother with a shotgun.99 The murder took place 
in the mother's home and in the presence of their five-year-old 
daughter. loo Moore then forced his daughter to remain in the house 
with the brutally mangled corpse for over a week. lol Afterwards, 
Moore took his daughter to his home in New Jersey where he com-
mitted suicide in the child's presence by shooting himself with a 
shotgun, causing his brain matter and blood to fly onto the child's 
93. See itt. at 19, 152 A. at 499-500. 
94. See itt. at 22, 152 A. at 500. The court explained that it was the relation of the 
parties, as parent and child, that made it ~inconvenient and improper that ei-
ther should undertake to sue the other at common law ... • [d. (quoting Mc-
Lane v. Curran, 43 Am. Rep. 535 (1882». 
95. See itt. 
96. See supra notes 43-89 and accompanying text. 
97. See Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951). 
98. 197 Md. 61,77 A.2d 923 (1951). 
99. See id. at 63, 77 A.2d at 924. The mother and father were not married, but 
had lived as husband and wife for several years. See itt. 
100. See itt. 
101. See id. The five-year-old child witnessed the death of her mother, in which the 
shotgun wound blew away the right portion of the mother's head. See itt. A 
portion of the skull landed on the kitchen table, and the mother's body col-
lapsed over the back of the chair she had been sitting in and came to rest in 
a pool of blood. See itt. 
1998] Eagan v. Calhoun 247 
face and clothing. l02 As a result, the child suffered severe shock, 
mental anguish, and permanent nervous and physical injuries. 103 In 
a suit against Laura Moore, the father's widow and executrix, the 
court found that the father's actions amounted to malicious, delib-
erate acts that displayed a complete abandonment of the parental 
relationship.l04 The court ruled that, as a result of the father's acts, 
he had forfeited his right to invoke parent-child immunity. lOS 
Second, the parent-child immunity doctrine does not apply 
when a child has reached the age of majority because both the par-
ent and child are adults. I06 When the child reaches the age of ma-
jority, courts reason that there is no longer a concern that a civil ac-
,tion, brought by either the parent or the child, will disrupt the 
peace and harmony of the home. I07 In this situation, both the child 
and the parent are considered free and separate persons and the 
child is no longer subject to the control of or entitled to receive 
any services from the parent. 108 
The parent-child immunity doctrine continues to apply, how-
ever, when a child reaches the age of majority, but brings an action 
for wrongs a parent committed when the child was a minor.l09 For 
example, in Renko v. McLean,l1O an emancipated child sued her 
mother for injuries she sustained as a minor while riding in her 
mother's automobile. 111 The court reasoned that if it allowed this 
type of action, the parent-child immunity doctrine could be circum-
vented with ease. 112 The minor child could simply wait until she 
reached the age of m~ority before initiating a suit, thereby render-
ing parent-child immunity "an obstacle easily overcome with the 
passage of time."113 
Third, the parent-child immunity doctrine does not bar a mi-
nor's tort action for negligence committed br the parent's busi-
102. See id. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. at 68-69, 77 A2d at 926. 
105. See id. 
106. See Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 126, 128 A.2d 617, 627 (1957) (holding 
that a mother may sue her adult son for injuries sustained by the son's negli-
gent operation of an automobile). 
107. See id. 
108. See id. 
109. See Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 473, 697 A2d 468, 472-73 (1997). 
110. 346 Md. 464, 697 A.2d 468 (1997). 
111. See id. at 467, 697 A.2d at 469. 
112. See id. at 473, 697 A.2d at 472-73. 
113. [d. at 473, 697 A2d at 472. 
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ness. 114 The rationale is that neither parental authority nor family 
harmony are significantly impaired by a minor child hringing this 
type of case. lIS The policy underlying the parent-child immunity-
maintaining familial harmony-is not as prevalent in the business 
context, particularly when liability insurance insulates the family re-
lationship from the full economic impact of litigation. 116 In forming 
a business, the parent is deemed to have assumed the risk of expo-
sure to tort liability from persons injured through the activities of 
the business. 117 
Finally, the parent-child immunity doctrine does not apply to 
stepparents. In Warren v. Warren,Jls the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land refused to extend immunity to stepparents, regardless whether 
or not they stood in loco parentis119 to the injured child. l20 The court 
reasoned that parental duties and obligations were imposed upon 
natural parents as a part of nature itself, but that stepparents are 
under no legal obligation to shoulder these responsibilities. 121 Ex-
tending parent-child immunity to stepparents would afford them 
the benefits of being a natural parent without imposing any paren-
tal obligations on them. 122 Therefore, the Warren court held that the 
114. See Hatzincolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 342, 550 A.2d 947, 948 (1988) 
(holding that the parent-child immunity doctrine should not apply when an 
unemancipated child of a business partner sues another partner alleging neg-
ligence). 
115. See ill. at 358-59, 550 A.2d at 956. The court reasoned that the family obvi-
ously discussed the economic ramifications of such a suit and if the suit were 
unacceptable within the family unit, it would not have been brought at all. See 
ill. at 358, 550 4-.2d at 956. Furthermore, the fact that a parent's partnership 
may have liability insurance serves to encourage such a suit, rather than dis-
courage it. See ill. 
116. See ill. at 345, 550 A.2d at 949. 
117. See ill. at 358, 550 A.2d at 956. 
118. 336 Md. 618, 650 A.2d 252 (1994). 
119. "In the place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously, with a par-
ent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BUCK'S LAw DICTIONARY, 787 (6th 
ed. 1990). 
120. See Warrm, 336 Md. at 628,650 A.2d at 257. 
121. See ill. at 628-29, 650 A.2d at 257. 
122. See ill. at 629, 650 A.2d at 257. The court further explained that parent-child 
immunity is only available to natural parents because the obligations between 
natural parents and children are reciprocal, whereas stepparents are free to 
leave without any such obligations. See id. at 629-30, 650 A.2d at 257. The 
court ultimately saw no similarity between the stepparent-child relationship 
and the parent-child relationship mainly because neither the stepparent nor 
the child have any obligation or privilege to control the other. See ill. at 630, 
650 A.2d at 258. 
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civil suit between the two parties could stand. 123 
E. The Current Status of the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine in Maryland 
While Maryland courts are willing to acknowledge certain ex-
ceptions to the parent-child immunity doctrine, cases reveal that 
support for the doctrine has remained firm in other areas of the 
parent-child relationship. Specifically, in instances of motor tort 
cases, Maryland has refused to abrogate or qualify the doctrine. 124 
In addition to promoting the traditional public policy rationales 
that support the doctrine,l25 the Court of Appeals of Maryland has 
expressed concern that permitting actions for motor torts would 
make the insurance carrier, rather than the parent, the ultimate 
defendant}26 The fear is that these suits could create a situation in 
which a family would agree to bring a suit to collect compensation 
available under the insurance policy and not cooperate in the in-
surer's defense. 127 This could adversely affect society by causing the 
cost of liability insurance to rise. l28 
In Montz. v. Mendaloff,129 the court of special appeals declined to 
abrogate the parent-child immunity doctrine in a motor tort suit 
that involved negligent conduct by the parent. l30 In Montz., a child 
was traveling in a vehicle that her mother operated in a careless 
manner.131 The car swerved off the road and struck an embank-
123. See ill. 
124. See Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 697 A.2d 468 (1997); Warren v. Warren, 
336 Md. 618, 650 A.2d 252 (1994); Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 
(1985); see also Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 147, 571 A.2d 1219, 1223 (1990) 
(holding that the parent-child immunity doctrine applied even though the 
parent's relationship had not culminated in a marriage and the family did not 
reside in a common home); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 723, 272 A.2d 435, 
442 (1971) (holding that a minor, unemancipated child is not answerable to 
his parents for injuries he caused). 
125. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
126. See Frye, 305 Md. at 566, 505 A.2d at 838. The court found that if such an ex-
ception were allowed, a parent's freedom from liability would ultimately be 
determined by the presence of insurance. See itt. 
127. See itt. But cf. Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 228-29, 388 A.2d 568, 573 
(1978) (Gilbert, CJ., concurring) (stating that most parents enter into an au-
tomobile insurance agreement with the understanding that the policy will pro-
vide protection for their minor children). 
128. See Frye, 305 Md. at 566, 505 A.2d at 838. 
129. 40 Md. App. 220, 388 A.2d 568 (1978). 
130. See ill. at 225, 388 A.2d at 571. 
131. See ill. 
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ment, causing the child to sustain injuries. 132 The court held that 
the mother's conduct did not warrant invoking the exception to im-
munity established in Mahnkel33-for malicious and wanton 
wrongs. 134 
The mother was taking her injured dog to the veterinarian and 
the dog's distress caused her to become distracted and lose sight of 
the road. 13s While her conduct may have been careless, the court 
found nothing in the record which would amount to a complete 
abandonment of the parental relationship.136 Furthermore, the 
court reasoned that although they could foresee circumstances in 
which a parent's actions would amount to gross negligence, thereby 
demonstrating a complete abandonment of the parental relation-
ship, the Mahnke exception should be construed narrowly.137 
In cases before Maryland courts concerning parent-child immu-
nity, parties often present similar policy arguments in favor of com-
pletely abrogating the doctrine}38 For example, in Frye v. Frye,t39 the 
mother, as next friend, sued the father of her child when the child 
was injured while the father was driving his automobile. l40 In Frye, 
the mother urged the court to abrogate the parent-child immunity 
doctrine in the manner that it had previously abrogated inter-
spousal immunity.141 The court declined, noting that the abrogation 
of interspousal immunity did not automatically require a departure 
from parent-child immunity precedent. 142 The decision to abrogate 
interspousal immunity was premised upon society's changing views 
concerning the unity of legal identity that a husband and wife were 
previously presumed to share. 143 The same reasoning did not pro-
132. See itt. The mother claimed that she had been distracted when the family dog 
became disruptive in the backseat. See itt. 
133. See itt.; see also supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. The court found 
that the accident was not caused by any deliberate action on the part of the 
mother. See Montz, 40 Md. App. at 225, 388 A.2d at 571. 
134. See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. 
135. See Montz, 40 Md. App. at 225, 388 A.2d at 511. 
136. See itt. 
137. See itt. at 223-24, 388 A.2d at 571. 
138. See, e.g., Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 548, 505 A.2d 826, 829 (1986). 
139. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986). 
140. See id. at 544, 505 A.2d at 827. 
141. See itt. at 552-53, 505 A.2d at 831-32 (citing Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 
462 A.2d 506 (1983) (abrogating the interspousal immunity rule as to negli-
gence cases». 
142. See itt. at 557, 505 A.2d at 834. 
143. See itt. at 559-61, 505 A.2d at 834-36. 
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vide support to abrogate the parent-child immunity doctrine. l44 
Although the parent-child immunity doctrine was created, en-
forced, and modified by the judiciary, the Frye court refused to ab-
rogate the doctrine without direction from the General Assembly.14s 
The court bolstered its reluctance to abrogate the doctrine by ex-
plaining the compelling public interests the doctrine serves--pre-
serving, under normal circumstances, the internal harmony and in-
tegrity of the family unit and protecting parental discretion in the 
discipline and care of a child. l46 The parent-child immunity doc-
trine serves the legitimate purpose of "insulating families from the 
vagaries and rancorous effects of tort litigation."147 If the doctrine 
was completely abrogated, Maryland courts fear that they would be 
subjected to rebellious children and frustrated parents who would 
use the power of the court to mediate parent-child disputes and 
oversee parental decisions. l48 
Other reasons suggested for the doctrine "include the preven-
tion of fraud and collusion among family members to the detriment 
144. See id. at 557-58, 505 A.2d at 834. While a husband and wife are no longer 
considered to be one legal identity, a parent and child are still joined by the 
duties of nature and parenthood. See id. (citing Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 
107, 126, 128 A.2d 617, 627 (1957». . 
145. See id. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839. The Frye court explained: "IT we effect the ex-
clusion by judicial action, 'we discard our robes for legislative hats without the 
electoral accountability that legitimizes the legislative product or executive en-
forcement. mId. (quoting Doe v. Duling, 782 F.2d 1202, 1207 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(explaining the difference between the roles of the judiciary and of the legis-
lature in our society». The court noted that abrogating parent-child immu-
nity in automobile torts would certainly have an impact on compulsory motor 
vehicle insurance. See id. Therefore, abrogating parent-child immunity in cases 
involving motor torts is a matter of public policy better addressed by the Gen-
eral Assembly. See id.; see also Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 626, 650 A.2d 
252,256 (1994) (declining to create a motor tort exception to parent-child im-
munity and reaffirming the decision in Frye). 
146. See Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 468, 697 A.2d 468, 470 (1997) (holding 
that the parent-child immunity doctrine barred a child's claim against her 
mother because the doctrine is essential to the maintenance of family disci-
pline and stability). 
147. Id. at 483, 697 A.2d at 478. 
148. See Warren, 336 Md. at 626, 650 A.2d at 256. The Wanm court further argued 
that parents will be forced to weigh the benefits of guiding and disciplining a 
child against the "looming specter of being hauled into court by an opportu-
nistic attorney for the child." Id. (quoting Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So.2d 906, 
913 (Miss. 1992»; see also Skinner v. Whitley, 189 S.E.2d 230 (N.C. 1972) (sug-
gesting that abrogation would lead to wrongful judicial discretion in the ordi-
nary operation of the household). 
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of third parties, and the threat that intrafamilial litigation will de-
plete family resources." 149 In sum, the doctrine, as adopted and re-
fined by Maryland courts, continues to act as a meaningful barrier 
for minors attempting to sue their parents based on acts that grow 
out of the parent-child relationship. ISO Despite the exceptions to the 
parent-child immunity doctrine, Maryland essentially retains the 
rule that there can be no liability for acts that occur while parents 
are carrying out their natural duties for their children. lSI 
F. The Interaction Between the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine and Wrong-
ful Death Statutes 
Maryland's wrongful death statute provides that a wrongful 
death action "may be maintained against a person whose wrongful 
act causes the death of another."IS2 The statute states that an action 
shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent or child of the 
deceased person. IS3 Recovery under Maryland's wrongful death stat-
ute may include damages for mental anguish, emotional pain and 
suffering, loss of society, companionship, comfort, protection, mari-
tal care, parental care, filial care, attention, advice, counsel, train-
ing, guidance or education. lS4 
In Maryland, wrongful death actions are not completely deriva-
tive in nature and can be best analyzed through a two-pronged 
framework. First, a court must determine whether a "wrongful act" 
occurred, as defined by Maryland's wrongful death statute- the de-
rivative prong. 1SS Second, a court must determine whether the 
149. Renko, 346 Md. at 468, 697 A2d at 471; see also Wanm, 336 Md. at 625, 650 
A2d at 255 (explaining that parent<hild immunity preserves parental disci-
pline and control, prevents fraud and collusion, and eliminates the threat that 
family resources will be depleted by litigation). 
150. See Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 134, 190 A 753, 756 (1937) (holding that there 
can be no parental liability for passive acts of negligence incident to the pa-
rental relationship). The Yost court prevented a child from bringing a suit 
against his father for failure to pay child support to the mother, distinguish- . 
ing this as "passive negligence" rather than an "overt act of tort." Ill. 
151. See id. 
152. MD. CoDE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PRoc. § 3-902(a) (1995). 
153. See id. § 3-904(a); see also Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 76 Md. App. 524, 535, 
547 A2d 654, 659 (1988) (explaining that unlike a survival action, a wrongful 
death action arises not from the injury to the decedent, but from his or her 
death). 
154. See MD. CoDE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PRoc. § 3-904(d). 
155. A wrongful act is defined as "an act, neglect, or default including a felonious 
act which would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and re-
cover damages if death had not ensued." [d. § 3-901 (e). 
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claimant's wrongful death action is barred by any defense applicable 
to the claimant, regardless whether the defense is applicable to the 
decedent-the personal prong.156 
Under the derivative prong, a wrongful act occurs when the 
tortfeasor's action or inaction would have entitled the decedent to 
recover damages against the tortfeasor if death had not ensued. 157 
Accordingly, a surviving family member may not maintain a wrong-
ful death action if the decedent would not have been able to re-
cover against the tortfeasor had the decedent lived. ISS As illustrated 
in Smith v. Gross, parent-child immunity may be one of the defenses 
that would preclude the decedent from maintaining an actioJl for 
damages against the tortfeasor had the decedent lived. 1S9 
In Smith v. GroSS,I60 the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied re-
covery in a mother's action for the wrongful death of her child. 161 
The child died in an automobile accident caused by his father's 
negligence. l62 As a surviving parent, Ms. Smith sued the child's fa-
ther, claiming solatium damages l63 suffered as a result of the "tragic 
loss of her [only] son." 164 The court explained that under the deriv-
ative prong of Maryland's wrongful death statute, a wrongful death 
action can only be maintained if the decedent would have had a 
156. See Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 82,698 A2d 1097, 1102 (1997) ("[A wrong-
ful death action] is a personal one to the claimant [and] the claimant is ordi-
narily subject to any defense that is applicable to him or her, whether or not 
it would have been applicable to the decedent."). 
157. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
158. See Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 144, 571 A2d 1219, 1221-22 (1990) (denying 
a mother's wrongful death action against a negligent father because parent-
child immunity would have barred the deceased child's claim against his fa-
ther had the child survived the car accident); Frazee v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. 
Co., 255 Md. 627, 632-34, 258 A2d 425, 427-28 (1969) (holding that the dece-
dent's contributory negligence barred plaintiff's recovery in a wrongful death 
action). 
159. See Smith, 319 Md. at 149, 571 A2d at 1224. 
160. 319 Md. 138, 571 A2d 1219 (1990). 
161. See ill. at 148, 571 A2d at 1224. 
162. See ill. at 140-41, 571 A2d at 1220. 
163. See Daley v. United States Auto Ass'n, 312 Md. 55Q, 553 n.2, 541 A2d 632, 633 
n.2 (1988) (explaining that "solatium" damages are those damages allowable 
pursuant to section 3-904(d) of the Maryland Code Annotated, Courts andJudicial 
Proceedings Article). Solatium is defined as " [d]amages allowed for injury to the 
feelings." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1391 (6th ed. 1990). 
164. Smith, 319 Md. at 141, 571 A2d at 1220 (alteration in original) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
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cause of action against the tortfeasor had the decedent lived. 16s 
Under the circumstances in Smith, if the child had lived, he would 
not have been entitled to maintain an action against his father for 
negligence because parent-child immunity would have precluded 
the child's suit. l66 Thus, the court held that there was no wrongful 
act as defined by the wrongful death statute. 167 Accordingly, the 
mother's wrongful death action was barred. '68 
In its analysis, the court examined the wrongful death statute 
to determine whether the statute made an explicit exception to the 
parent-child immunity doctrine. '69 The court noted that parent-child 
immunity has been a part of Maryland's jurisprudence since it was 
adopted in 1930,170 and refused to imply that the legislature in-
tended to create an exception to the parent-child immunity doc-
trine for wrongful death actions.17I The court reasoned that had the 
legislature intended for an exception, it would have expressly indi-
cated that within the wrongful death statute. 172 
165. See itt. at 144, 571 A.2d at 1221. 
166. See itt. at 148, 571 A.2d at 1224. Although the mother and father had not mar-
ried or shared a common household, the court did not find this to be deter-
minative in assessing whether a family relationship existed. See itt. at 147, 571 
A2d at 1223. Mr. Gross was clearly the father of the child and there was no 
evidence to show that the father had forfeited the obligations and responsibil-
ities of parenthood. See itt. 
167. See itt. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224. 
168. See id. However, the dissent asserted that the father should not be afforded 
the immunity in a case when, because of the death of the child, there was no 
policy of family harmony to be served. See id. at 156, 571 A.2d at 1227 (El-
dridge, J., dissenting). Judge Eldridge reasoned that because the death of the 
child severed the relationship, "[t]his suit cannot be contrary to public policy, 
for the simple reason that there is no home at all in which discipline and 
tranquiIIity are to be preserved." Id. at 154, 571 A.2d at 1226 (Eldridge, j., dis-
senting) (quoting Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926 (1951». 
169. See itt. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224. 
170. See Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 23, 152 A. 498, 500 (1930) (holding 
that a mother was not entitled to maintain a suit in negligence against her 
son for injuries sustained in an automobile collision); see also supra notes 
90-95 and accompanying text. 
171. See Smith, 319 Md. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224. 
172. See itt. Judge Eldridge, in his dissent, reveals that the wrongful death statute 
was actually a modification of the common law. See itt. at 151,571 A.2d at 1225 
(Eldridge, J., dissenting). In 1852, the General Assembly derived the wrongful 
death statute from Lord Campbell's Act. See itt. at 151-52, 571 A.2d at 1225 
(Eldridge, j., dissenting). However, parent-child immunity was not recognized 
in Maryland until 1930, more than 75 years after the enactment of the wrong-
ful death statute. See id. at 153, 571 A.2d at 1226 (Eldridge, j., dissenting). As a 
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Smith demonstrates how parent-child immunity can affect the deriv-
ative prong of Maryland's wrongful death statute. 173 Until Eagan v. 
Calhoun, however, Maryland courts had not addressed the effect 
that parent-child immunity could have on the personal prong of 
Maryland's wrongful death statute. 174 The precise question 
presented in Eagan was whether a child could maintain a wrongful 
death action against a parent for the death of the other parent, 
when the deceased parent would have had a viable claim against the 
surviving spouse if the deceased had lived. 175 The Eagan court was 
forced to squarely address whether a parent could invoke parent-
child immunity when sued by a child for the wrongful death of the 
child's other parent}76 
III. THE INSTANT CASE 
A. Factual Background 
John and Gladys Calhoun were married on June 15, 1974, and 
had two children-Laura, born on October 4, 1980, and Kevin, 
born on July 23, 1982.177 The couple had experienced marital diffi-
culties, including an extramarital affair between Mr. Calhoun and a 
co-worker. 178 On the itftemoon of May 13, 1992, the Calhouns were 
cleaning the gutters of their home and Mrs. Calhoun was standing 
on a ladder several feet above the ground. 179 During a heated argu-
result, when the General Assembly created the survival and wrongful death ac-
tions, the parent<hild immunity could not be excluded because it did not ex-
ist. See id. at 156, 571 A.2d at 1227 (Eldridge, J., dissenting). Therefore, it 
seems illogical to say that if the legislature wanted to exclude the rule from 
the statute, it would have done so expressly. 
173. See id. at 149, 571 A.2d at 1224. 
174. In Latz. v. Lab:, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (1971), the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland barred a father's wrongful death action against his minor 
daughter for negligently causing the death of her mother in an automobile 
accident. See id. at 734, 272 A.2d at 443. However, it is not clear from the 
court's analysis which prong the court analyzed the case under. In either case, 
the result would be the same. Under the derivative prong, the mother, had 
she lived, would not have been able to maintain an action against her daugh-
ter because of parent<hild immunity. Thus, the father's wrongful death action 
would be barred. Under the personal prong, the father's wrongful death ac-
tion against his daughter would be barred because of parent<hild immunity. 
175. See Calhoun v. Eagan, 111 Md. App. 362, 383, 681 A.2d 609, 619 (1996). 
176. See infra notes 216-38 and accompanying text. 
177. See Eagan, III Md. App. at 367, 681 A.2d at 611. 
178. See id. 
179. See id. 
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ment, Mr. Calhoun kicked the ladder, causing Mrs. Calhoun to fall 
to the ground and sustain serious head injuries. ISO Mr. Calhoun did 
not attempt to administer CPR, call for medical assistance, or other-
wise provide aid to his injured spouse. lSI Instead, he continued with 
other activities, keeping himself and the children away from the 
family home and the gravely injured Mrs. Calhoun. ls2 Later that 
night, Mrs. Calhoun's nephew discovered her dead body}S3 
Mr. Calhoun was arrested and charged with second degree 
murder, voluntary manslaughter, and reckless endangerment. l84 Pur-
suant to a plea agreement, Mr. Calhoun pleaded guilty to voluntary 
manslaughter and was sentenced to five years imprisonment}SS Sub-
sequently, James Eagan, as guardian and next friend of both chil-
dren, instituted a wrongful death action against Mr. Calhoun. 
B. The Civil Trial for Wrongful Death 
At the close of his case, and after the close of all the evidence, 
Mr. Calhoun made a motion for judgment based on the parent-
child immunity doctrine. ls6 The trial court found that the case 
could fit within the Mahnke exception IS7 and submitted three ques-
tions to the jury: 
[1]With respect to Plaintiffs' claims that the Defendant, 
John C. Calhoun, committed a wrongful act or acts which 
caused the death of Gladys E. Calhoun, how do you 
find?[2] With respect to Plaintiffs' claims that the wrongful 
180. See ill. The detective testified at trial that the argument related to a caustic re-
mark that Mrs. Calhoun had made which "challenged his [Mr. Calhoun's] 
manhood." Id. at 370, 681 A.2d at 612 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Mr. Calhoun became angered by her comment and kicked the ladder. See id. 
The detective testified that Mrs. Calhoun's head injuries were "inconsistent 
with a fall from a ladder." Id. at 371,681 A.2d at 613. In the detective's opin-
ion, Mrs. Calhoun "lacked ancillary injuries that would be consistent with a 
fall from a ladder" and had two wounds on the top of her head, likely caused 
by a blow from a blunt object. Id. at 371-72, 681 A.2d at 613 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
181. See id. at 367, 681 A.2d at 611. 
182. See ill. Mr. Calhoun washed, changed his clothes, went to the hardware store, 
picked his children up at school, met with a teacher, and went to his daugh-
ter's softball game. See id. 
183. See id. at 368, 681 A.2d at 611-12. 
184. See ill. at 370, 681 A.2d at 612. 
185. See id. 
186. See id. at 373, 681 A.2d at 614. 
187. See id. at 374, 681 A.2d at 615. For a discussion of the Mahnke exception, see 
supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. 
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act or acts of the Defendant, John C. Calhoun, were atro-
cious, show a complete abandonment of the parental rela-
tion, were intentional, were willful and malicious, how do 
you find? [3] [If] it found for the plaintiffs on Question 1 
or both Questions 1 or 2, what damages it found that the 
plaintiffs had suffered as a result of the wrongful act or acts 
of the Defendant. 188 
257 
The jury found in favor of the children on the first question, 
but could not come to a verdict on the second. 189 The jury then 
awarded the children a total of $2,360,000 in damages. l90 The trial 
judge declined to resubmit the second question and entered final 
judgment in favor of the children}91 
C. The Decision of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
On appeal, the court of special appeals reviewed the continu-
ing integrity of the parent-child immunity doctrine l92 and con-
cluded: the "doctrine of parent-child immunity remains deeply em-
bedded in the law of Maryland; it is up to the General Assembly to 
decide whether it is time to change the law."193 The court then fo-
cused on the fact that although a wrongful death action has a deriv-
ative component, it is nonetheless a personal suit against the 
defendant to recover for the plaintiff's own injuries}94 Therefore, 
any traditional defense that the defendant could assert against the 
plaintiff personally, including parent-child immunity, could be 
188. Eagan, 111 Md. App. at 374, 681 A2d at 614-15 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
189. See ilL at 375, 681 A2d at 615. 
190. See itt. The damages consisted of the following: 
$70,000 to Laura and $90,000 to Kevin for "pecuniary/economic 
damages" until their eighteenth birthdays; $1,000,000 to each child 
for "mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, 
companionship, comfort, protection, parental care, attention, advice, 
counsel, training or guidance"; and $100,000 to each child for costs 
of education that they could reasonably expect would have been paid 
by their mother. 
Id. at 375 n.4, 681 A2d at 615 n.4. 
191. See ilL at 376, 681 A2d at 615. Calhoun's counsel requested resubmission of 
the second question to the jury. See ilL at 375, 681 A2d at 615. Eagan ob-
jected, arguing that once the jury found that there was a wrongful act, the 
jury was allowed to move immediately to a determination of damages and they 
need not do more. See itt. 
192. See itt. at 37~2, 681 A2d at 616-19. (Eldridge, J. dissenting). 
193. Id. at 382-83, 681 A2d at 619. 
194. See ilL at 385, 681 A2d at 620. 
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raised. 195 
In order for a child to prevail in spite of the parent-child im-
munity defense, there must either be an express exception to the 
parent-child immunity doctrine within the applicable wrongful 
death statutel96 or the circumstances must fit within one of the pre-
viously recognized exceptions. 197 While the children's guardian ar-
gued to the court that Calhoun's behavior squarely fit within the 
Mahnke exception,198 Mr. Calhoun asserted that his behavior had not 
shown a "'complete abandonment of the parental relation. ml99 Fur-
thermore, because he wished to reunite with his children, Mr. Cal-
houn argued that the suit against him would "'unduly impair disci-
pline and destroy the harmony of the family. "'200 Mr. Calhoun 
reasoned that, in his case, applying the parent-child immunity doc-
trine would serve the policy purposes underlying immunity.wI 
The court, however, found that Mr. Calhoun's subjective intent 
to continue his parental relationship with his children was irrelevant 
in deciding whether to apply the parent-child immunity doctrine.202 
Rather, the issue was framed as whether Mr. Calhoun injured his 
children by a tortious act that constituted cruel and inhuman treat-
195. See itt. 
196. See id. at 386, 681 A2d at 621. The court rejected the reasoning espoused by 
the dissent in Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34 n.2 (1983), that parent<hild im-
munity did not exist when the wrongful death statute was first created. See 
Eagan, III Md. App. at 388, 681 A2d at 621; see also supra note 172. Rather, 
the fact that the General Assembly has modified and revised the statute, with-
out removing the parent<hild immunity, was found indicative of the General 
Assembly's intent to include the immunity in the statute. See Eagan, III Md. 
App. at 389, 681 A2d at 622. 
197. See supra notes 97-123 and accompanying text. 
198. See Eagan, 111 Md. App. at 374, 681 A2d at 614; see also supra notes 97-105 
and accompanying text. 
199. Eagan, 111 Md. App. at 392, 681 A2d at 623 (quoting Mahnke v. Moore, 197 
Md. 61, 68, 77 A2d 923, 926 (1951». Calhoun argued that he had not aban-
doned the relationship because he cared for his children after his wife's 
death, made arrangements for their care and support, and wished to rejoin 
them after he was released from prison. See itt. at 392-93, 681 A2d at 623-24. 
However, the children's counselor testified at trial that Laura was fearful of 
her father, did not trust him, and did not wish to live with him after he was 
released from prison. See id. at 372, 681 A2d at 613. Also, Kevin remained un-
able to talk about the loss of his mother. See itt. ' 
200. Id. at 392, 681 A2d at 624 (quoting Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A2d 
923, 926 (1951». 
201. See itt. 
202. See itt. at 396, 681 A.2d at 625. 
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ment or a wanton and malicious wrong.203 The court found that the 
trial court had correctly denied Mr. Calhoun's motions for judg-
ment based on the potential applicability of the Mahnke excep-
tion.204 However, the court of special appeals found that the jury's 
inability to reach a verdict with respect to the second instruction-
whether Mr. Calhoun's behavior was intentional and malicious-was 
of critical importance.2os The court of special appeals determined 
that a mistrial should have been declared; the jury needed to deter-
mine whether Calhoun's conduct was "cruel and inhuman treat-
ment or a malicious and wanton wrong within the meaning of 
Mahnke."206 The court also found that it was reversible error for the 
trial court to rule, as a matter of law, that Calhoun's conduct was 
"cruel and inhuman" or "wanton and malicious" without a jury rul-
ing on that precise question.207 As a result, the court of special ap-
peals reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for 
a new trial.208 
D. The Decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari, vacated 
the court of special appeals's decision, and remanded with instruc-
tions to affirm the judgment of the trial court.209 The court found 
that a new trial would not be necessary because the jury had de-
cided that Mr. Calhoun had committed a wrongful act and Mr. Cal-
houn admitted that the act was intentionaJ.2lO Thus, by virtue of the 
jury's finding that Mr. Calhoun had committed a wrongful act, the 
evidence on review was sufficient, as a matter of law, to hold him li-
able for Mrs. Calhoun's death under Maryland's wrongful death 
203. See ilL 
204. See ilL at 398, 681 A2d at 626; see also supra notes 97-105 and accompanying 
text. 
205. See Eagan, III Md. App. at 399, 681 A2d at 627. The jury's deadlock on a 
question does not mean that it rules in favor of one party or another. See ilL 
Therefore, if it did not base its holding on the question of the father's acts, 
then it did not find that his actions did or did not fit within the Mahnke ex-
ception. See id. 
206. Id. at 400,681 A2d at 627 (quoting Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A2d 
923,926 (1951»(internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra notes 97-105 
and accompanying text. The court declined to speculate on what it or the jury 
might have decided. See Eagan, III Md. App. at 400, 681 A2d at 627. A re-
mand was necessary in order to decide these essential factual issues. See id. 
207. Id. at 366, 681 A2d at 611. 
208. See id. 
209. See Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 88, 698 A2d 1097, 1105 (1997). 
210. See infra text accompanying notes 225-33. 
260 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
statute.211 Furthermore, the court held that the Mahnke exception 
embraced voluntary manslaughter.212 
First and foremost, the court declined to abrogate the parent-
child immunity doctrine,213 just as it had recently declined to do so 
in Renko v. McLean.214 The court upheld the continuing validity of 
the doctrine and applied it to the personal prong of Maryland's 
wrongful death statute.21S The court explained that the wrongful 
death action was personal to Kevin and Laura and would be subject 
to any defense or immunity that could be asserted against the chil-
dren.216 Therefore, Eagan, on behalf of the children, struggled to 
maintain the suit because parent-child immunity could be asserted 
as a bar against the children's wrongful death action.217 
However, the court recognized that if the parent's behavior met 
the standard of wrongful behavior embodied in the Mahnke excep-
tion,2J8 there would no longer be any justification for applying the 
parent-child immunity doctrine.219 The court noted that when the 
death of a parent is occasioned by voluntary manslaughter, the par-
ent-child relationship is shattered by the parent's willful acts and 
not by the ensuing lawsuit.220 This criminal act shatters the family 
relationship in such a way that the policy considerations underlying 
parent-child immunity are no longer served and the need to protect 
211. See infra text accompanying notes ~34-35. 
212. See Eagan, 347 Md. at 88, 698 A2d at 1105. 
213. See id. at 81,698 A2d at 1102 (citing Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 473, 697 
A2d 468, 472-73 (1997». 
214. 346 Md. 464, 473, 697 A2d 468, 472-73 (1997). 
215. See Eagan, 347 Md. at 81, 698 A2d at 1102. 
216. See ill. at 82, 698 A2d at 1102. The court rejected Eagan's argument that be-
cause Gladys would not have been barred from suing her husband for his in-
tentional wrong, the children were not barred either. See ill. 
217. See ill. at 83,698 A2d at 1102~3. 
218. See ill. at 83, 698 A2d at 1103; see also supra notes 97-105 and accompanying 
text. 
219. See Eagan, 347 Md. at 83-84, 698 A2d at 1103. The court explained: 
When the conduct giving rise to the action is of such a nature to 
have, itself, destroyed the family harmony and significantly eroded 
any realistic prospect of parental control and discretion, and there is 
no indication of fraud or collusion or the risk of depleting resources 
that otherwise would be devoted to the family unit, there is no 
longer any justification for the immunity and therefore no logical or 
public policy reason to apply it. 
[d. at 83, 698 A2d at 1103. 
220. See ill. at 83-84, 698 A2d at 1103. 
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the family no longer exists.221 
Following this rationale, the court determined, as a matter of 
law, that the immunity should not apply when a wrongful death ac-
tion was predicated on an act amounting to voluntary manslaugh-
ter.222 In addition, the court stated that the "application of the doc-
trine in such a case does not depend on the particular underlying 
circumstances, which, in their details, will likely vary from case to 
case. "223 The court explained that a finding of voluntary manslaugh-
ter would automatically constitute the cruel and inhuman treatment 
necessary to pierce the shield of immunity.224 
The court of appeals did not view the fact that the jury had not 
answered the second jury question as fatal to the trial court's deci-
sion.22S The jury did not need to determine whether Mr. Calhoun's 
acts were atrocious, showed a complete abandonment of the paren-
tal relation, or were intentional, willful, or malicious.226 If the evi-
dence demonstrated that Mr. Calhoun's acts were intentional, cou-
pled with the jury's decision that the killing was a wrongful act, the 
"atrociousness of it and its effect as an abandonment of the paren-
tal relation . . . follow [ ed] as a matter of law. "227 The court noted 
that the critical issue in finding Mr. Calhoun liable was whether the 
conduct causing his wife's death was intentional.228 
The Eagan court held that the jury did not need to determine 
whether John Calhoun's killing of his wife was intentional because 
221. See ill. The court noted that no policy would be served by applying the im-
munity here, as the "underpinnings of the immunity doctrine no longer ex-
isted." Id. at 84, 698 A.2d at 1103. No family unit existed because the mother 
was dead and the father in jail. See ill. The father had no parental discretion 
or control because the children were living with another family. See ill. The 
children did not want to continue any personal relationship with their father 
and did not respond to their father's letters. See ill. Furthermore, the family 
resources would not be depleted and no collusion existed. See id. Indeed, the 
father's resources had been depleted when he defended the criminal charges 
he faced. See ill. 
222. See ill. 
223. Id at 84-85, 648 A.2d at 1103. 
224. See ill. at 84-85, 698 A.2d at 1103-04. The court reasoned that murder or vol-
untary manslaughter constituted "cruel and inhuman treatment, not just of 
the person killed but of the other family members as well." Id. at 85, 698 
A.2d at 1104. 
225. See ill. at 88, 698 A.2d at 1105. For a complete recitation of the trial court's 
jury instruction, see supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
226. See ill. at 86, 698 A.2d at 1104. 
227. Id. 
228. See ill. 
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of particular evidence that was elicited at trial.229 In Calhoun's mem-
orandum that he submitted in support of his motion for summary 
judgment, he made the costly mistake of attaching a memorandum 
from a collateral proceeding to demonstrate the close feelings he 
had towards his children.230 The memorandum noted that Calhoun 
had entered a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter, and the 
Eagan court deemed this a judicial admission that his act was inten-
tionaP31 In the memorandum, Mr. Calhoun further conceded that 
he was subject to the slayer's rule and could not share in any part 
of his wife's estate.232 Calhoun was· therefore estopped from assert-
ing any position contrary to this admission.233 
Ultimately, the court held that the Mahnke exception applied as 
a matter of law when one parent admits to intentionally killing the 
other.234 The court vacated the court of special appeals's judgment 
and remanded the case with directions to affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court.235 
Before rendering its holding, however, the court issued a caveat 
against extending the Mahnke exception to all wrongful death ac-
tions.236 It noted that many tragic deaths are caused by negligence 
or non-willful behavior that does not generally destroy the family re-
lationship.237 In Eagan, however, the court explained that parent-
child immunity was improper because the mother's death was due 
to voluntary manslaughter and not caused by simple negligence.238 
229. See ill. 
230. See id. at 87, 698 A.2d at 1105. 
231. See ill. at 87, 698 A2d at 1104-05. 
232. See id. at 87, 698 A2d at 1105. Calhoun submitted a memorandum of law dur-
ing the proceeding concerning guardianship of his two children which stated, 
"the death of GlADYS ESTHER CALHOUN was homicide, homicide was volun-
tary manslaughter, Mr. Calhoun was the criminal agent . ... He was convicted of 
voluntary manslaughter and incarcerated. The elements are prima facie within 
the ambit of the slayer's rule." Id. 
233. See id. at 88, 698 A2d at 1105. The court noted: [A] party will not be permit-
ted to maintain inconsistent positions or to take a position in regard to a mat-
ter which is directly contrary to, or inconsistent with, one previously assumed 
by him, at least where he had, or was chargeable with, full knowledge of the 
facts, and another will be prejudiced by his actions.ld. (citing 28 AM. JUR 2D 
Estoppel and Waiver § 68, at 694-95 (1966». 
234. See ill. 
235. See ill. 
236. See ill. at 83, 698 A2d at 1103. 
237. See ilL 
238. See id. 
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Additionally, the court observed that its holding paralleled the 
slayer's rule, which precludes persons guilty of murder or voluntary 
manslaughter from profiting from their own culpable conduct.239 
Specifically, the slayer's rule prevents one who commits a "felonious 
and intentional" homicide from claiming inheritances and insur-
ance proceeds from the victim.240 Many states have enacted legisla-
tion, or "slayer's statutes," that prevent killers from receiving any 
benefit from their victims' deaths.241 These slayer'S statutes are 
meant to effect the broad common-law policy that killers should not 
profit from their wrongdoing.242 Although Maryland has not enacted 
a slayer's statute, the Eagan court recognized that the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland has formulated a common law slayer'S rule in 
three decisions: Price v. Hitajjer,243 Chase v. jenifer,244 and Schifanelli v. 
Wallace.245 
In Price, an order of the orphan's court prevented a husband's 
estate from receiving any distribution from his deceased wife's es-
tate.246 The husband shot and killed his wife, and subsequently com-
mitted suicide.247 The Price court held that neither the murderer 
239. See Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 518, 165 A. 470, 475 (1933) (holding that no 
man can profit from his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong); 
Chase v.Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 570,150 A.2d 251, 255 (1959) (holding that the 
killing was both felonious and intentional, therefore, the killer could not re-
cover as a beneficiary of the victim's insurance policy); Schifanelli v. Wallace, 
271 Md. 177, 189, 315 A.2d 513, 519 (1974) (noting that a beneficiary's rights 
are not barred if they caused the death of the insured unintentionally or by 
gross negligence). 
240. See Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 111, 512 A.2d 389, 392 (1986) (summarizing the 
law of the slayer's statute delineated in the earlier decisions of Price, Chase, 
and Schifanelh). 
241. See ill. at 125-27, 512 A.2d at 399-400 (providing a comprehensive index of 
states that have enacted slayer's statutes); see also Lakatos v. Billotti, 1998 WL 
822108 (W. Va. Nov. 20, 1998) (holding that the slayer's statute precluded a 
murderer from taking property held in joint tenancy with the victim); Estate 
of Greico v. Bankers Am. Life Assurance Co., 674 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409 (Slip Op. 
06026) (finding that a husband who killed his wife could not collect as a ben-
eficiary of her insurance policy, but was considered to have predeceased his 
wife, and ordering that the payments be made to her estate). 
242. See Price, 164 Md. at 506, 165 A. at 470. 
243. 164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933). 
244. 219 Md. 564, 150 A.2d 251 (1959). 
245. 271 Md. 177,315 A.2d 513 (1974); see also Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 85, 
698 A.2d 1097, 1104 (1997) (citing Price, Chase, and Schifanelh). 
246. See Price, 164 Md. at 506, 165 A. at 470. 
247. See id. The issue before the court was whether a murderer, or his heirs or rep-
resentatives, could be enriched by receiving any portion of his victim's estate. 
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nor his heirs or repre~entatives could profit in any way from the vic-
tim's death.248 Not only would this rule extend to bar any type of in-
heritance, but it would also prevent the slayer from collecting insur-
ance proceeds from the victim's pOlicy.249 
Two decades after Price, the court of appeals held that the 
slayer's rule barred any type of recovery by the slayer when the kill-
ing was both felonious and intentional in Chase v. Jenifer.2SO The 
Chase court clarified that the slayer's rule prohibits a person from 
recovering any benefit or profit as a result of voluntary manslaugh-
ter because this type of killing is both felonious and intentiona1.2S1 
Finally, in SchifaneUi v. Wallace,2S2 the court narrowed the slayer's 
rule espoused in Price and Chase by holding that it would not apply 
when a person unintentionally caused the death of another.2S3 
See id. As a case of first impression in Maryland, the court analyzed the two 
prevailing views concerning this issue. See id. One line of authority applied 
common-law principles of equity to prohibit an individual from profiting from 
his own wrongdoing or acquiring property by his own crime. See id. The op-
posing view was that a criminal conviction should not lead to forfeiture of an 
estate or an inheritance. See ill. at 506-07, 165 A. at 470. Courts espousing the 
latter view declared that the distribution of estates should be governed by tes-
tamentary statutes, not by common law. See id. 
248. See ill. at 516-17, 165 A. at 474. 
249. See id. 
250. 219 Md. 564, 570, 150 A.2d 251, 255 (1959). In Chase, a husband named his 
wife as the beneficiary of his life insurance policy. See id. at 565, 150 A.2d at 
252. His wife was subsequently convicted of voluntary manslaughter in his 
death, and was disqualified from recovering the proceeds. See id. Although the 
trial court did not designate whether the manslaughter was voluntary or invol-
untary, it decided, upon the facts, that the act was intentional. See id. at 
568-69, 150 A.2d at 254. 
251. See id. at 570, 150 A.2d at 255. 
252. 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513 (1974). 
253. See ill. at 188, 315 A.2d at 519. In Schifanelli, the husband accidentally shot and 
killed his wife while teaching her how to properly operate a gun. See id. at 
181, 315 A.2d at 515. The trial court found that although the shooting was un-
intentional, the husband was guilty of gross negligence. See ill. at 182, 315 A.2d 
at 516. However, the court held that the slayer's rule did not prevent the hus-
band from collecting life insurance proceeds as a named beneficiary of his 
wife's policy. See id. at 188, 315 A.2d at 519. The court noted that, "the over-
whelming weight of authority allows recovery where the beneficiary causes the 
death of the insured unintentionally or not feloniously." Id. The court ex-
plained that the slayer's rule had no application when the death was caused 
by accident, gross negligence, involuntary manslaughter, or carelessness. See id. 
at 188-89, 315 A.2d at 519; see also Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 123, 512 A.2d 
389, 398 (1986) (holding that if the "slayer" is insane at the time of the kill-
ing, then the killing is not felonious in contemplation of the slayer's rule and 
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Despite the holding in SchiJaneUi, the slayer's rule is finnly im:.. 
bedded in Maryland's jurisprudence; it effectively prevents killers 
from gaining any benefit from their victim's death, including 
money, property, or insurance proceeds.2S4 In the instant case, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland aligned the parent<hild immunity 
doctrine with Maryland's slayer's rule. Both common law rules con-
fonn with the broad public policy that a person who commits a fe-
lonious and intentional killing should not benefit from that con-
duct whether through pecuniary gain or immunity from suit.2SS A 
killer could claim these proceeds, however, if the homicide was un-
intentional, despite the fact that such gross negligence would 
render the killer guilty of involuntary manslaughter.2s6 Thus, the 
slayer's rule and the Eagan court's decision are in hannony; if a par-
ent's death was predicated by murder or voluntary manslaughter, 
the offending parent cannot benefit from his criminal conduct by 
invoking parent<hild immunity.2S7 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Policy Reasons for Applying the Mahnke Exception as a Matter of Law 
Although many jurisdictions have abrogated the parent<hild 
immunity doctrine, Maryland courts still find a reason to retain it. 
Parents should be allowed to discipline and control their children 
in a reasonable cmanner, without the constant fear of litigation 
brought by an unhappy child. The bulk of parent<hild immunity 
litigation involves automobile torts in which the injuries were acci-
dental and not willful acts.2S8 In these cases, Maryland's courts have 
resoundingly refused to abrogate the immunity because they have 
not found a substantial basis for allowing such suits.2S9 
However, Maryland courts have acknowledged circumstances 
when the supposed policies behind the doctrine would not be fur-
thered by its application.260 When the parent's wrongful acts are will-
the rule does not apply). 
254. In addition, Maryland courts have construed the term "any benefit" to in-
clude the protection of parent-child immunity. See supra notes 246-51 and ac-
com-panying text. 
255. See Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 85, 698 A2d 1097, 1104 (1997). 
256. See Ford, 307 Md. at 112, 512 A2d at 392. 
257. See Eagan, 347 Md. at 85,698 A2d at 1104. 
258. See, e.g., Renko v. McLean, 346 Md. 464, 697 A2d 468 (1997); Frye v. Frye, 305 
Md. 542, 505 A2d 826 (1986). 
259. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text. 
260. See supra notes 96-123 and accompanying text. 
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ful, wanton, and intentional, the parent-child immunity doctrine 
does not allow parents to avoid tort liability simply because they are 
"the parent." The possibility of a child's lawsuit has little effect on 
the family when the peace and harmony has already been destroyed 
by the parent's acts. Fraudulent and collusive suits are unlikely, for 
the child may have no desire to associate with the parent to insti-
tute such a claim. Indeed, the child's inability to sue their parent 
might destroy familial harmony more than the possibility of litiga-
tion. A child should not be made to suffer injuries at the hands of 
their parents and subsequently be crippled further by a doctrine 
which silences their cries for justice. The instant case serves as a 
clear example of a situation in which the doctrine did not further 
any worthwhile policy and could not be applied without reaching 
absurd and unjust results. 
The court of appeals has repeatedly refused to abrogate the 
parent-child immunity doctrine in its entirety.261 Instead, it has 
chipped away at the doctrine by creating specific exceptions and 
construing those exceptions narrowly.262 Although the doctrine was 
created at the hands of the judiciary, the courts have claimed that 
their hands are tied when it comes to abrogating the doctrine with-
out explicit approval from the General Assembly.263 The court of ap-
peals has relied on stare decisis to justify its inaction,264 stating that 
the power of the doctrine is evidenced by its lasting presence in our 
jUrisprudence.26S The courts have interpreted the legislature's inac-
tion in this area as an intent of the General Assembly to retain the 
doctrine.266 As a result, it is unlikely that the doctrine will be abro-
gated in the courtroom, ultimately shifting this burden to the 
legislature. 
Maryland courts' passivity suggests a reluctance on their part to 
expand tort liability, especially between family members. Perhaps 
261. See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text. 
262. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text. 
263. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
264. See Montz v. Mendaloff, 40 Md. App. 220, 227, 388 A.2d 568, 572 (1978). The 
court reasoned that the Maryland legislature had been aware of the doctrine 
since its creation by the courts in 1930, and had not taken action to change 
or remove it. See id. at 224, 388 A.2d at 570. Because of this inaction, the court 
reasoned that the doctrine had been "firmly embedded in the law of Mary-
land and [therefore] decline[d] to change it." [d. (citing Sanford v. Sanford, 
15 Md. App. 390, 290 A.2d 812 (1972». 
265. See id. 
266. See id. 
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the judiciary does not want the responsibility of promoting more lit.:. 
igation in an already overburdened judicial system. Additionally, the 
courts seem to regard the possibility of intra-familial litigation as fly-
ing in the face of a sacred institution-to expand the permissible 
categories would suggest a destruction of the family itself.267 Regard-
less, the judiciary, as creator of the doctrine, retains the power to 
abrogate it when extreme circumstances call for relief. 
Perhaps the judiciary has waited too long for a sign from the 
legislature, and should abrogate the doctrine altogether. The doc-
trine was adopted into Maryland jurisprudence by the COUrts,268 who 
now claim that abrogation is not in their power.269 The court can be 
both creator and abrogator, and should abrogate the doctrine with 
the clarifications espoused by the Supreme Court of California in 
Gibson-the reasonable parent standard.270 Under a Gibson-styled ap-
proach, parents may reasonably discipline and control their chil-
dren without having "carte blanche" to abuse or harm them.271 Ma-
ryland could settle legitimate claims between parents and children 
without trammeling on the privacy of the household. 
Although the Eagan court was unwilling to completely abrogate 
the doctrine, their holding in the instant case remains a just and ra-
tional conclusion.272 The parent-child immunity doctrine should not 
apply when the parent has committed willful and felonious acts. 
First, no policy considerations are furthered by preventing a child's 
wrongful death action predicated on voluntary manslaughter. Had 
the killer been a complete stranger, the law would have afforded 
the same child a means for recovery without hesitation. Neverthe-
less, when the defendant in such an action is the other parent, 
courts are wary to automatically allow recovery because it might dis-
rupt family harmony.273 The argument that any degree of family har-
mony could remain after a parent has committed such an atrocious 
act is misguided and irrational. No court or institution should allow 
a child to return to a parent whose willful and malicious acts consti-
tute voluntary manslaughter against another family member. To fur-
ther prevent a child from recovering civil damages under these cir-
cumstances would be yet another injustice in our judicial system. 
267. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text. 
268. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text. 
269. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
270. See supra notes 52-68 and accompanying text. 
271. Gibson v. Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 652-53 (Cal. 1971). 
272. See Eagan v. Calhoun, 347 Md. 72, 81, 698 A2d 1097, 1102 (1997). 
273. See id. at 84, 698 A2d at 1103. 
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The court of appeals's continued reluctance to construe the 
Mahnke exception more broadly did not impinge on its decision in 
the instant case.274 While this decision did not create a new excep-
tion to the parent-child immunity doctrine per se, it implicitly ex-
pands the Mahnke exception.275 The Eagan case allows a court to 
hold that a parent's acts are so egregious as to constitute a com-
plete abandonment of the parental relationship when a parent ad-
mits to voluntary manslaughter during the civil suit.276 When volun-
tary manslaughter forms the basis of the wrongful death action, this 
exception follows as a matter of law.277 
Finally, the court expressly refused to expand the Mahnke ex-
ception278 to every wrongful death action.279 The court stated: 
Tragic deaths often arise from acts of negligence or exces-
sive, but non-willful, behavior on the part of family mem-
bers-automobile accidents, carelessness in the home, for 
example-and, although such tragedies may well put a seri-
ous strain on some of the family relationships, they do not 
generally destroy a parent-child relationship.280 
For this reason, the Mahnke exception specifically applies to those 
wrongful death actions that have destroyed the family unit to the 
point in which no public policy consideration would be served by 
applying the doctrine.281 When the act amounts to voluntary man-
slaughter, it is sufficiently egregious to destroy the underpinning 
considerations of the doctrine.282 
B. The Impact of Eagan v. Calhoun on Domestic Abuse 
Domestic abuse is a growing and prevalent phenomenon in to-
day's society.283 Annually, at least two million children and from two 
274. See id. 
275. See id. 
276. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text. 
277. See Eagan, 347 Md. at 86, 698 A.2d at 1104. 
278. See id. at 83, 698 A.2d at 1103; see also supra notes 97-105 and accompanying 
text. 
279. See Eagan, 347 Md. at 83, 698 A.2d at 1103. 
280. [d. 
281. See id. 
282. See id. 
283. See THE MD ArrORNEY GEN.'S & LT. GoVERNOR'S FAMILY VIOLENCE COUNCIL, MA-
RYLAND FAMILY VIOLENCE COUNCIL REPORT: STOP THE VIOLENCE: A CALL TO Ac-
TION. RECOMMENDATIONS & ACTION PLAN, at 1 (Nov. 1996). The report lists do-
mestic violence as one contributing factor to "the epidemic of family violence 
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to four million women are physically abused by the people closest 
to them.284 Abuse by a husband or boyfriend "is the single largest 
cause of physical injury to women in America, more common than 
burglary, muggings, and other physical crime[s] combined."28s 
Nearly thirty percent of all murdered women are killed by a current 
or fonner husband or boyfriend.286 Maryland is not immune from 
these statistics. The Maryland State Police reported 24,021 spousal 
assaults in the calendar year of 1995.287 The instant case reflects the 
type of behavior between spouses that results in death and subse 
quently shatters the entire family. The holding, in turn, reflects a 
growing awareness that criminal redress alone does not compensate 
the surviving family members for the loss of a parent. The holding 
in this case allows a child to maintain a wrongful death action 
against a parent who has abused the other parent to the point of 
death. Domestic abusers must now face both criminal and civil dam-
ages when their anger and hatred amount to atrocious and heinous 
crimes such as murder or voluntary manslaughter. 
Nevertheless, the court of appeals seems to cling to the idea 
that parent-child immunity is the proper protection for responsible 
parents who discipline their children. Certainly this objective ap-
pears admirable when innocent parents are sued by their children 
for an act of simple negligence that may occur in the nonnal 
course of a family'S relationship. However, immunity should not ex-
tend to those parents whose acts are inconsistent with that of a par-
ent. Intentional and malicious acts against any person should not 
go without remedy merely because of a family relationship, espe-
cially when the family no longer exists. 
The Eagan holding could create an avenue for a parent who 
wants to bring a wrongful death action for the death of a child at 
the hands of the other parent. Should one parent's willful acts 
amount to murder or voluntary manslaughter, Eagan may be con-
strued to allow the other parent to bring an action for the wrongful 
'death of the child. However, if the death of the child occurs due to 
negligence in an automobile tort, a parent's suit would fail, as it did 
that has been spreading in households across the United States." Id. 
2~. See itt. 
285. See itt. 
286. See itt. 
287. See itt. at 76. The report states that there was an 18% increase in spousal as-
saults from 1994, when the number of reported spousal assaults totaled 20,378. 
See itt. at 1. 
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in Smith v. GroSS,288 because of the continuing vitality of the parent-
child immunity doctrine in motor tort cases.289 However, the hold-
ing in Eagan may allow a mother or father to bring a wrongful 
death action when the other parent abuses the child to the point of 
death. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The holding in the instant case demonstrates that Maryland's 
highest court recognizes that there are instances in which parent-
child immunity does not serve a worthwhile purpose. While the 
complete abrogation of the doctrine does not appear imminent, the 
instant case demonstrates a willingness to rectify those crimes that 
will escape punishment under it. Perhaps the intensity with which 
children are harmed by their parents will wake the court and force 
them to create new exceptions or abrogate the doctrine entirely. As 
Chief Judge Gilbert argued in Montz. v. Mendaloff,290 abrogating the 
immunity would "lift unemancipated minors from their current sta-
tus of second class citizens, a position in which they have been 
thrust by the parental immunity doctrine, and recognize that un-
emancipated minors have the same rights as everyone else. "291 The 
arguments of stare decisis and legislative inaction do not bolster the 
vitality of the doctrine. Rather, these arguments reveal a weakness 
on the part of the judiciary in failing to support the rights of young 
people in Maryland by removing the universal bar of parent-child 
immunity.292 
The parent-child immunity doctrine has outlived its usefulness 
in Maryland jurisprudence and should be abrogated with a "reason-
able parent" standard as provided by th~ Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in Gibson. Until the court or the legislature removes the univer-
sal bar on such suits, the exceptions to the parent-child immunity 
are a fair and equitable alternative. While the Eagan court's holding 
. does not take any steps toward completely abrogating the parent-
child immunity, it subjects the parent to civil damages for wrongful 
288. See supra notes 159-72 and accompanying text. 
289. See supra notes 124-37 and accompanying text. 
290. 40 Md. App. 220, 388 A.2d 568 (1978). 
291. Id. at 228, 388 A.2d at 573. 
292. Cj. Montz v. Mendalofi', 40 Md. App. 220, 228, 388 A.2d 568, 573 (1978) (Gil-
bert, CJ., concurring) ("To me there is no valid reason why the branch of 
government that gave birth to the doctrine cannot lay it to rest when, as here, 
there exists compulsory automobile liability insurance."). 
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intentional acts.293 As a result, the rights of children are n01 subju-
gated by the confines of the immunity, but are expanded to allow 
for compensation for a parent's wrongful death. 
Dena M. Dietrich 
293. See supra notes 218-38 and accompanying text. 
